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• Dannatt: UK army caught in 'perfect storm in 2006'
• Resources stretched in Iraq and Afghanistan
•'Snatch' Land Rover 'significantly exposed' in Iraq
• Read the afternoon summary
4.46pm: Prashar presses Jackson on the planned tour length for soldiers. (It used to be four months but a long time ago moved up to six months.) But in the context of Iraq, rather than say Northern Ireland, this was reviewed. But the outcome was not revolutionary. They decided not to go back to four months, even though the six months required a short leave break in the middle. It was different for senior officers. For a number of reasons, including what their American counterparts were doing, the tendency was to have longer period in the field: one year, sometime two years.
4.42pm: Jackson moved on under questioning about helicopters. We referred earlier to further documents, released today, which show General Sir Mike Jackson had serious concerns about the helicopter fleet. "The overall picture is one of a [helicopter] force ill-matched to support our current operations," he wrote after a visit to Iraq in 2005 Jackson says trying to enlarge capabilities quickly is never easy, particularly when you need technical capacities. "You have what you have at the time. Perfection ain't going to be there."
4.41pm: Freedman tries to probe further as to how decisions about new vehicles are made and the role of the military. Jackson says he doesn't recall the defence management board around during his time, requesting "x or y". Freedman says is it the case of the more high profile areas, for example, determining priorities. Jackson agrees to a point. He says the difference between the army and the other two services is that they equip the man, whereas in the others staff man the equipment. "There is a sense I think in the army that if times are tight you take a bit off the army without it being too dramatic."
Friedman says "Snatch" Car Land Rover, he was trying to push this process? Yes, says Jackson, referring to an important meeting with the then Minister for Procurement, Lord Drayson. He stressed the moral duty. He said Drayson could use its powers to cut through some of the sites. Jackson Drayson make a real contribution.
?€? footnote to this: the declassified memorandum of Ministers, Lieutenant-General Sir Nicholas Houghton released yesterday shows on demand, ministers have been officially warned that the military should be an alternative to "Snatch" Land Rover partway through Iraq and Afghanistan.
• But British troops continued to be killed and injured in the lightly armored "Snatch", which is vulnerable to roadside bombs, during several more years.
• The senior officer confirmed that commanders required an alternative to the use of the "Snatch" or tracked armoured vehicles on current operations.
• The letter was sent to defence procurement minister Lord Drayson and copied to defence secretary Des Browne and armed forces minister Adam Ingram as well as the defence chiefs of staff.
• The government was conscious of criticism of the use of the "Snatc"h Land Rover, which critics have blamed for the deaths of dozens of UK servicemen and women in roadside bomb attacks in Iraq and Afghanistan.
• A hand-written annotation to the memo reads: "NB note. Ministers can no longer say in the House that they have had no request from commanders for an alternative to the Snatch."
• Drayson's assistant private secretary wrote back requesting advice on how to get the required number of new more heavily armoured vehicles ready to send to Iraq in November 2006.
• This confirms the fact that Jackson spoke about Drayson put their powers to good use.
4.30pm: Jackson says he was asking for something on new vehicles that was not "gold-plated" but quick to turn around, even if it wasn't 100%. It was to avoid excess time and cost. But it was a "cry in the wilderness". Freedman asks where this idea of gold-plating comes from. Doesn't he have influence? Jackson says it was the defence procurement agency that decided the specification for new vehicles. Jackson raises the issue of who is setting the specifications. "All the army does is state what capabilities they need in the new vehicles." Jackson says he doesn't want to be critical, because he understands why people strive for the best, but it leads to delay and cost.
4.25pm: Freedman presses him on moves to improve the "Snatch" Land Rovers or find alternatives. How involved was he? Jackson says this is one area that is frustrating for a single service chief, because you don't have the cheque book and you're not the lead for procurement. He cites a reorganisation that took place following a review by consultants. The conclusion was that the armed services were the customer No 2, and responsibility for ordering equipment would be with another department ... It gets a bit detailed but the upshot is that Jackson was left at "arms length" of the process of buying equipment. It's very frustrating, he says. Though he repeats that "Snatch" Land Rovers do have a place. Freedman claims the head of the army has a lack of influence/direct control over core equipment. Jackson agrees.
4.23pm:
4:16 pm: Jackson is being drawn on reinforcement capabilities. He says part of the judgement the army has to make is the pressure its troops can withstand. "Of course it depends what they're being asked to do." Jackson says the deployable army is about 75-80,000, though not all of them are fully trained. Lyne says all these considerations are technical, but did he relay to Blair at the time his concerns about stretching the army. Jackson says single service chiefs have a right to ask for an audience with the PM, but the defence of chief has a regular slot with the premier. Lyne says but surely as head of the service carrying the biggest burden, did he not raise this with Blair when he inquired. Not that way around, as I recall, he says, which suggests Blair didn't check with him directly. Jackson says he had confidence that the defence chief was reflecting the concerns he has been highlighting about stretch strain and reinforcement.
4.08pm: Lyne is still playing with the concept of an overheated machine â€" he actually said overstretched machine. Jackson says the arithmetic worked, but the commitment/morale factor was something else. it was a judgement. Jackson says he had signalled that the timetable would not be achieved in Iraq. But by that time the British were a key part of the Nato plan in Afghanistan and it wouldn't have been, in his view, possible to withdraw, because it would have had serious implications for Afghanistan.
4.06pm:
4.05pm: Lyne cites Dannatt's comments this morning of conditions being created for a "perfect storm" in 2006, due to the twin demands of Iraq and Afghanistan. Were ministers aware of the pressures that were being placed by the planned deployment in Afghanistan? Jackson says it was unreasonable at the time to have forecast Iraq to a few hundred. By the time they had signed up to the Nato Afghanistan plan, the quandary of being squeezed on two sides was because of the reality of the Iraqi forecast was not going as planned. But on Afghanistan, the decision was not just down to the British since Nato forces were involved. Such a decision would have disrupted the plan. Lyne presses him about whether ministers appreciated all this. Jackson tries to recall. Sketchily, he recalls it was "yes we can do our part in Afghanistan, if we achieve a draw down in Iraq".
4.02pm:
3.57pm: Jackson says his visits to Iraq were not confined to the south. In late autumn 2005, things in the Sunni triangle were not looking good â€" he says that wasn't the sense he had in the south. He says he got to a place that the military had to see things through. By the time he left office in the summer of 2006 he says: "We were staring failure in the face. We weren't there. Nor had been."
3.54pm: Jackson said it wasn't ideal that the military ended up training the new police force, but it was better than nothing.
3.51pm: Freedman asks Jackson about a letter he wrote the chief of the defence of staff in April 2005, in which he highlighted the lack of discernible progress over the establishment of a Iraqi police service, "not to mention a criminal justice system". These two structures were a prerequisite to eventual military disengagement, so the lack of progress was "alarming". Jackson's note was more sanguine about the progress of the Iraqi army.
Jackson tells the panel the police under Saddam's reign had been used in a lawless and corrupt way, so it was important to instil confidence in the populace with a new police regime.
3.46pm: Jackson says the referendum and initial elections in Iraq to achieve a new Iraqi government was a huge step towards achieving the strategic objective. The replacement of the coalition provisional authority (CPA) with the first elected government was a "huge stride in the right direction", since the CPA symbolised the invasion.
3.44pm: January 2004 â€" Jackson wrote that the Iraqi army was "embryonic". He added: "I fear it will be a long way from functioning at anything above company level by the end of the year."
Pressed today, Jackson said he was trying to point out it was important not to overestimate the speed with which they could build up the new forces. It was an attempt to remove rose-tinted spectacles. Freedman asks whether he was trying to highlight flawed policy, or a flawed timetable. Jackson says it was a timetable issue.
3.42pm: Lyne cites a previous witness, Sir Kevin Tebbit, who said he was concerned the military would be stretching itself by going into Afghanistan while still in Iraq. Jackson says Nato involvement in Iraq started around 2005, and there was an intricate plan by which they would takeover on a province-by-province basis anti-clockwise from the north. Helmand was in the plan for the summer of 2006. But in 2004 the British planning assumption was that we would be out of Iraq or still on a training basis. Those conditions had not been met, but that was the assumption at the time. Jackson adds that it might occur when it became clear the Iraq timetable had slipped, "one should delay Afghanistan, but we were part of this great Nato plan, with the great impetus behind it. So we did find ourselves for the next 18 months, having to balance off these two theatres".
3.40pm: The boundary between southern Iraq - the area of British responsibility - and the rest, wasn't a formal one "but it began to feel like one". We're now looking at 2004 - about a year after the invasion. Roderic Lyne recalls the time of the G8 summit, and the following Nato summit, where it was decided that the arc would encompass Afghanistan, as if the latter had become a more popular stage. Jackson says he wouldn't put it quite like that. But he can agree that as Iraq went on without visible, real - in the sense of public improvement â€" its approval rating was going down. Also there was a sense, certainly then, that Iraq, after the fall of the Taliban, was somewhat put on the backburner. The sense was that they had been defeated, but not destroyed, and more was going to have to be done.
3.32pm: Jackson says it was "myopic" not to look at the insurgency campaign as a whole, rather than just the south, but he was out-voted.
• General Sir Mike Jackson told the inquiry he was "surprised" about why the initial planning of the invasion of Iraq, there was little or no commitment to the British Army . "I was mystified by the original thinking and I didn't understand it," he said. It appears Jackson was less concerned than his predecessor Sir Richard Dannatt about overstretch.
• Dannatt said the competing priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan meant the British army was in "perfect" The Tempest "in 2006 and was close to the" taking up " . In his evidence during the morning session. Dannatt likened the army in 2006 to a car "running hot". [10.29am,10.34am ]
• Both Jackson and Dannat expressed concern about the lack of post-conflict planning in Iraq. The situation deteriorated when defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld mounted a "hostile takeover" of the Pentagon under Colin Powell, Dannatt said.
• Dannatt expressed significant concerns about equipment, saying the controversial "Snatch" Land Rover was "significantly exposed" in Iraq and that there was a "significant" problem with helicopters. Dannatt expressed his frustration that a replacement light armoured patrol vehicle has not been found, putting this down to a "deficiency in leadership and energy". [11.22am]
• Declassified documents show Jackson had serious concerns about the helicopter fleet. "The overall picture is one of the [] force helicopter medley in support of our ongoing operations" he wrote after his visit to Iraq in 2005.
3.23pm: The assumption usually is that you have a large land force as a "one off", and then you "downsize".
Gilbert asks about the declassified reports, which include a letter highlighting Jackson's concerns about resources in light of the growing violence two months after the invasion.
Although it is only about 30+days since combat operations ceased, public percetion and expectation is critical in maintaing security. 1 (UK) armed div have formulated a sound plan involving all the lines of operation, and effect that are required to create a viable state. However, they have reached the limit of their technical capabilities and desperately need subject matter experts...
You can read all this, on May 13, here (PDF) . It also cites a "complete lack of direction" and lack of support, such as NGOs.
Gilbert asked Jackson whether these needs have been anticipated. "Not to the extent that the events actually happened", he said, stressing the seriousness of the situation that arose.
"It was a honeymoon period in the south. I can remember walking without body armour or steel helment - indeed buying a carpet, I think. But that did not last very long."
He describes the serious deterioration that had occurred three months. The question that the deterioration will affect the British situation, Jackson said that they were out of the original soft profile, which holds, in his view, used by military personnel on the ground, as the situation worsens.
"A harder profile had to be balanced by the battle to win hearts and minds," he says.
3.10pm: He said he had sought similar advice before the invasion of Kosovo. Back on phase four, and postwar planning, Prashar asks about the defence spending assumptions at that time, and whether they had raised them. He says the defence spending assumptions had been set in 1998 and "we have been working outside of them ever since". He said the matter was discussed among the chiefs but it was ultimately up to the defence chief to lead on that.
3.05pm: Prashar cites Jackson's book, Soldier, published in 2007, in which he discusses the legality issue. He points out that Saddam had been in defiance of the requirements enshrined in all of them. Every extra resolution somewhat eroded the authority of the UN. But he was well aware that Britain was a signatory of the International Criminal Court and he didn't want to end up in prison as the neighbour of a man he had helped to put away, Slobodan Milosevic.
3.03pm: Prashar asks Jackson about the legality of the war. Jackson said the then attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, issued a discursive opinion in February in which he laid the arguments for or against invasion of iraq without coming to a conclusion. The military then requested a definitive statement of legallity. That led to the much shorter document where the attorney general concluded that the so called resolution was not strictly necessary. "I say 'so called' because there had been 17 resolutions by this time," he adds.
2.51pm: Freedman is probing where the channels lie for conveying senior military concerns about levels of preparations. There seemed to be widespread concern at senior levels about the adequacy of preparations for the task ahead - does that get conveyed to ministers? Oh yes, Jackson says. But we couldn't get our hands on the levers that were going to set the atmosphere for phase four, not helped by measures taken on the ground, such as disbanding Iraqi security forces, he says.
2:45 pm: Jackson says phase four planning throughout 2002 rested with the State Department in Washington. The Foreign Office was the lead department in Britain. But in January 2003, responsibility shifted to the Pentagon. He says his understanding was that the Pentagon was "unimpressed" with that work. This created concern.
There was a concern, yes, about what phase four would look like and how it was going to be.
Dominant sense in Whitehall would not be potential humanitarian problems. But it was wrong because the issue was security: 1.
2.44pm:
2:43 pm: Freedman turns to aftermath planning. Jackson was suggesting he wasn't sure that Washington had thought that phase through. Jackson said the length and scale of the duration of postwar planning had not been pinned down.
It may be one thing to defeat by maneouvre, but it's quite another thing to re-establish the country concerned into a stable country ... these are very big tasks indeed.
He says he has no memory of a finite time being given about phase four, though he says there was a plan to bring force levels down "as quickly as possible".
2.41pm: Chilcot presses on planning deadlines and whether this impacted on military readiness in March 2003. Jackson says that the logisticians "pulled their rabbits out of the hat", despite the short period they had to work with.
Jackson says military readiness is seen in terms of training. It's how well trained are you, do you have the people, do you have the equipment? And then you work with that, he says.
Chilcote says that Jackson reservists said that they were not prepared or used in such a way that make them feel competent. In fact, what to do with the speed of getting things ready? Yes, it 's fair, says Jackson. But he adds that the army is better to train reservists now.
There's a place they are sent to where they receive refresher courses, training and so on. He adds that it's striking that when you go out and visit (I assume he means the field), you can't tell the difference between a reservist and a regular soldier.
2.29pm: Jackson agrees that logistical planning for the invasion was "late in the day" - a point picked up by several senior military figures who have given evidence to the inquiry.
He agrees that the usual planning period is six months. Yet preparations did not begin until December 2002. Jackson said he understood that political considerations in the autum meant that there was a sensitivity about signalling that was inevitable. He cites desert combat clothing provision as an example.
2:23 pm: On resources, Jackson says that in 2002, the probability that large-scale military efforts would be needed was clear - though he suggests he was surprised that a large land force component wasn't being considered. Jackson says he never understood why land forces weren't put in as part of the offer in the first place.
I was mystified by the original thinking and I didn't understand it.
Asked if it might have been to do with cost or stretch, Jackson, says of course it's more expensive if you add a large land component, as well as increasing risk of casualties. He doesn't seem to think the stretch was the issue.
2.15pm: Jackson says that he had no doubts about the defeat of Saddam, but says he has doubts about the postwar aftermath, which he describes as "phase four".
There was the sense that while maneouvre war will be completed quickly and decisively, Phase 4 will not.
Asked if he felt there was a consensus in Whitehall across departments, Jackson says: "I'm afraid I didn't."
He says the job of nation-building required more than the military, so required interdepartmental consensus. By the late summer of 2003, when it was becoming clear that phase four would be "messy", he made the suggestion that it would be good to appoint a minister for Iraq. But this was not taken up, he says.
2.11pm: The session begins. Sir Roderick Lyne asks Jackson how much time he spent in Iraq as CGS (chief of the general staff). Jackson said he started in the role just a few weeks before the invasion.
At the start, Iraq consumed a lot of his time, but the intense degree of involvement diminished as time went on. Lyne asks him how he kept in touch with events out there.
Jackson said there were a number of channels used. He went out about eight or nine times during his tenure.
"You have to go out there because you can't get a sense of things sitting in Whitehall."
There were also reporting systems into the MoD and chief of staff meetings. In sum, he did not sense a "dearth of information".
Lyne asks him whether he felt Britain had a clear strategy about what they wanted to do? For the first part, yes, for the second part, "I'm less certain", he says.
1.41pm: The Chilcot inquiry grilling of Sir Mike Jackson starts at 2pm. Jackson was the predecessor of General Dannatt, who gave evidence this morning. He served as commander in chief of land command (2000 to 2003) and then as chief of the general staff (2003 to 2006).
Jackson will give evidence as documents published today by the inquiry reveal how he warned that the UK's helicopter fleet in Iraq was "creaking badly" and "inadequate".
Jackson also told the head of the armed forces, that air transport provision for troops and equipment and the Middle East even worse.
He raised the concerns after visiting British forces in Iraq in late 2005.
In a report to General Sir Michael Walker, then-chief of the defence staff, he repeated concerns expressed by commanders on the ground about problems with helicopters and transport aircraft.
He said it was proving almost impossible to meet requirements for troops to return home part way through their tours on "R&R" breaks, which had an effect on the effectiveness of the army division serving in Iraq.
In the declassified excerpt from his report, released today, dated October 2005, Jackson wrote:
Our support helicopter fleet is creaking badly. JHF-I (Joint Helicopter Force Iraq) is struggling to meet its tasks even with rigorous prioritisation ... The overall picture is one of an SH (support helicopter) force ill-matched to support current operations. If our SH capability is inadequate, our AT (air transport) fleet is worse. The air bridge to theatre is now so fragile that sustaining an efficient R&R schedule is nigh impossible. Quite apart from the morale effect of inordinate delays, the difficulties with R&R are now beginning to impact significantly on the operational effectiveness of the division.
1.14pm:It 's at the end of the testimony Dannatt'. The overarching theme was his basic view that Iraq was a conflict in which Britain should not be involved. "We can say that Iraq is discretionary, I would say that Afghanistan was not at its sole discretion," he said in a statement revealing.
• Dannatt said competing priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan meant the British army was caught in a "perfect storm" in 2006 and was close to "seizing up". The security situation in Iraq was deteriorating, but it was also important to commit more troops to Afghanistan. Dannatt likened the army in 2006 to a car "running hot". [10.29am,10.34am ]
• The lack of post-conflict planning in Iraq "made a difficult situation worse".The situation worsened when Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld set 'hostile capture "Pentagon in the United States Colin Powell.
• He expressed grave concern over equipment, claiming that the disputed "Snatch" Land Rover was "heavily exposed to" in Iraq, and that there "great" The problem with helicopters. Dannatt expressed his frustration that a replacement light armoured patrol vehicle has not been found, putting this down to a "deficiency in leadership and energy". [11.22am]
• Declassified documents show General Sir Mike Jackson had serious concerns about the helicopter fleet.\\ "The overall picture is one of the [] force helicopter medley in support of our ongoing operations" he wrote after his visit to Iraq in 2005.
That's it from me. Thanks for all your comments. My colleague Hélène Mulholland will be following General Sir Mike Jackson's evidence this afternoon.
1.11pm: Chilcot asks Dannatt whether there is anything else he would like to add.
"We have talked about the lack of proper campaign planning and the vacuum that was created in Iraq which made a difficult situation worse," Dannatt says. "We have talked about the slow way priorities have been applied to the expenditure of resources in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the need to prioritise rigorously between problems that are staring you in the face and problems that you might or might not face in the future. That balance still has to be addressed and that is a major challenge for the defence review that is ongoing," he says.
Dannatt also mentioned that the session has not discussed helicopters. The decision not to fund helicopter programmes has been a significant shortfall, he says. "We are paying the price for that in Afghanistan," he says.
12:59 pm: The problem from the middle of 2007 was that Iraq was an unpopular war, and Afghanistan got tainted by the same brush, says Dannatt.
Poor understanding of the Army changed the return parade. People got over the armed forces, t realize the last And no government "that. Now we must get the support of the mission in Afghanistan and not only the armed forces, said Dannatt.
12.56pm: Chilcot asks how the UK's role in Iraq should be viewed. At the middle level in the US military they couldn't understand why the British were not doing more in Iraq, Dannatt says. He says relations are good with the US despite some "lumpy moments" (that phrase again).
Some of our European allies were good, some other partners haven 'T. "The deal with the speck in your own eye mate, before considering this," Dannatt said about some of the UK 's European allies currently fall into a rather colorful phrases.
Basra has a chance of better future than it had under Saddam Hussein, Dannatt says of the legacy of the British involvement in Iraq.
The job the British were asked to do in southern Iraq was substantially done by the time we left in 2009. Our task was to guard the southern flank of the coalition â€" I think we did that ... Basra has the prospect of hope and development in the future.
12:51 pm: Gilbert asks about casualties and the notification of bereaved families. Families have complained of a dismissive attitude from the army. "If that is how some families felt that's a disaster and a tragedy." Dannatt replies. The visiting officer formula has been extremely helpful, with one or two exceptions, he says. Where there has been greater contention is the lack of legal representation of families at inquests.
If families felt they wanted representation, it should have been provided, Dannatt says. There have been moves towards a better process now, but it was deficient in 2005, 2006 and 2007, Dannatt says.
12.43pm: Asked to outline the deficiencies Dannatt lists pay, accommodation and the medical response to casualties. Referring again to the Daily Mail article Dannatt says it was important that he was fighting the corner of frontline troops. We had to do something to quickly to try to boost morale, Dannatt says.
Dannatt agrees to hand over his coffee-stained letter to Des Browne outlining his concerns.
12.38pm: Freedman puts forward the proposition that the army was frustrated with Iraq, and Afghanistan provided an opportunity to revive its reputation. "We were locked into a lumpy set of circumstances in southern Iraq. There was an opportunity to get it right," Dannatt says. But he insists the shift to Afghanistan was not done for the army's convenience.
You could say Iraq was discretionary, I would say Afghanistan was non-discretionary.
12.35pm: Referring to his Daily Mail article (9.37am) when he called for troops to be withdrawn soon from Iraq. The situation had changed between 2004 and 2006 and that had not been taken into account, Dannatt says. In 2006 in his first week as head of the general staff Dannatt wrote a "lengthy letter" to the defence secretary Des Browne raising issues about the army being stretched on two fronts.
12.26pm: In 2004 things were going relatively well in southern Iraq, so the decision to do more in Afghanistan was reasonable, Dannatt insists. By the summer of 2005 the situation had worsened in southern Iraq partly because of the use of EFPs (explosively formed projectiles).
12.20pm:If Iraq was the only show in town, we could increase the troops, too, but we certainly could not 't because of commitments in Afghanistan, Dannatt said.
Iraq and Afghanistan were two fronts of the same campaign, Dannatt says.
12.14pm: What was the strategic objective of the UK in 2006, Lyne asks. "That's a very good question," Dannatt says. We were the junior partner in both Afghanistan and Iraq, so the UK's national objective was not that relevant, he says.
Is there a risk of strategic failure, Lin asked. As a junior partner, we did not own a coalition strategy. In 2006-2007, they were at the peak of the change in strategy for the transfer to the Iraqis to a military escalation.
We were on the coat-tails going in other direction of handing over to the Iraqis province by province.
12.09pm: Sir Roderic Lyne asks about post-conflict planning. It looked as if the coalition was making it up as it went along, Lyne says. History shows that these things do take longer than you expect, Dannatt says, citing the examples of Northern Ireland and Bosnia.
Some planning was conducted for the aftermath (phase four in the lingo), Dannatt insists. But the problems arose when the then defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, mounted a "hostitle takeover" bid on the then secretary of state, Colin Powell, installing Paul Bremner as governor of Iraq.
There was a change of tactics, but no "plan B", Dannatt admits. The "de-ba'athfication process" - cleansing the Iraqi government and civil servants of members of Saddam's Ba'ath party - made matters worse, he adds.
If there is no plan, there is a vacuum, and into a vacuum malign forces will come, and that is exactly what happened.
12:05 pm: Glen Oglaza, political correspondent for Sky News, is also following the Chilcot inquiry today. He makes this pithy analysis of Dannatt's evidence so far on Twitter:
12:03 pm: Why did take until October 2006 for the MoD to come up with a statement about the priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan, Dannatt asks in exasperation.
11:56 am: Why does it take a minister to intervene to tackle an equipment problem? Dannatt is asked by Freedman. "One had to accept the decisions that were taken with a degree of frustration," Dannatt replies.
11:53 am: Dannatt reveals that an equipment demonstration was organised on Salisbury Plain to show the problems with vehicles to the then defence procurement minister Lord Drayson.
In the car returing from Salisbury, Drayson confessed that he had "no idea" the army had a problem. Dannatt says Drayson accepted the notion that the army needed new vehicles as quickly as possible.
There was a plan to start production in 2007. The new vehicles would been used in 2010, Dannatt says. But that programme was halted when Lord Drayson left the government for "personal reasons". The programme "stopped absolutely dead", Dannatt says.
Dannatt glossed over the reasons for Drayson's reason for leaving the government: in fact, it was to pursue his motor-racing ambitions.
11.48am: Dannatt says there were internal Whitehall machinations over the implementation of Fres. "I was horrified to find that the in-service date for Fres would be 2012," he says. Some felt it might not be ready until 2015 or 2018. "Where is the analysis about what our defence really needs?" Dannatt asked.
He adds that the Mastiff vehicles were no substitute for Fres utility vehicles.
11:43 am: The hearing continues where it left off with Dannatt discussing the Future Rapid Effect System or Fres, the MoD programme to deliver a fleet of armoured vehicles.
Had the programme gone ahead as envisaged we would have had capable vehicles, Dannatt says. The UK didn't go down that track, he adds, partly for reasons of affordability. It became more sophisticated and expensive than needed, he says. Asked who made that decision he says: "I don't know."
11:33 am: Here Sat summary 'evidence so far this morning.
• Sir Richard Dannatt said the competing priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan meant the British army was in "perfect" The Tempest "in 2006 and was close to the" taking up " . The security situation in Iraq was deteriorating, but it was also important to commit more troops to Afghanistan. Dannatt likens the army in 2006 to a car "running hot". [10.29am,,10.34am ]
• The controversial "Snatch" Land Rover was "significantly exposed" in Iraq. Dannatt repeatedly expresses his frustration that a replacement light armoured patrol vehicle has not been found, putting this down to a "deficiency in leadership and energy". [11.22am]
• Declassified documents show General Sir Mike Jackson had serious concerns about the helicopter fleet. "The overall picture is one of a [helicopter] force ill-matched to support our current operations," he wrote after a visit to Iraq in 2005.
11.31am:Here 's that to capture the lines in full, thanks to the Press Association. Dannatt it comes to disparities in pay, accommodation and equipment.
You can run hot when you are in balance and there is enough oil sloshing around the engine to keep it going. When the oil is thin, or not in sufficient quantity, the engine runs the risk of seizing up. I think we were getting quite close to a seizing up moment in 2006 ... We could see that perfect storm coming to fruition in about the middle of 2006 and I would contend that it did.
11:22 am: Dannatt is asked further about the problems relating to the Snatch Land Rover. He says:
We worked around the problem, we didn't actually confront the problem ... [this was] a deficiency in leadership and energy. It was really frustrating not to be able to get on with this. It would be wrong to say this was kicked into the long grass, but other solutions, workarounds, were preferred ... It seems incredible that we couldn't poroduce a three or four tonne light armoured vehicle before now.
Dannatt is asked where the lack of leadership lay: he partially dodges the question by saying it was down to competing resources. Other people didn't want to sacrifice other pieces of equipment, he says.
Chilcot calls a quick break before Dannatt goes into more technical detail.
11.17am: On Snatch Land Rovers, Dannatt is asked about whether there should have been improvements or a replacement. All commanders accept the need for a light patrol vehicle, Dannatt says. That was the justification for keeping it. There was nothing on the market to replace it quickly in 2003-2004 and the MoD is still deciding on its replacement. We had to accept that and develop "workarounds", Dannatt says.
When I said we should have the best car - they offered to put more armor on vehicles thought Dannatt obsolete in 1970. I took a deep breath, Dannatt said.
Why not use the "Hummers", as Amercians, Chilcote asked.
Humvees were just as bad as Snatch Land Rovers, Dannatt says, citing US problems.
11.11am: Dannatt says that equipment had been requested as "urgent operational requirements" for Iraq that had previously been struck out as cost savings.
We were putting things back in that were taken out.
Asked for specific examples Dannatt says the the Apache helicopter had a radio for supporting troops. This was then taken out as a cost-saving measure, and then put back in.
11.08am: Dannatt says that some of the discussion about terms of service were "tortuous".
Sir Lawrence Freedman is now asking about equipment. In general terms Dannatt says he was satisfied with equipment, but there was a problem reporting requirements from the ground to the Defence Procurement Agency. Land command could have helped more to understand troop requirements.
Once there was properly argued case, that was never turned down by the Treasury, Dannatt says. But he says not enough was done to ensure troops had the right equipment. "There was a defficiency in leadership and energy at times," he says.
11.01am: Prashar asks about continuity and six-month tour rotations.
I am implacable in my view ... that six months in the front line is as much as you can ask a soldier to do.
Dannatt tells the inquiry that he disagrees with US tours of 12 or even 15 months. "I have seen some very tired American soldiers," he said. But he says that the US attitude was different because it was a "nation at war".
But it might be different for senior commanders, Dannatt says. At that senior level continuity is at a premium, Dannatt says, but he stresses that combat troops should do no more than six months.
10.55am: As usual, the Chilcot inquiry has posted declassified documents. We're just going through these now. One striking document (pdf) is a report of a visit to Iraq by General Sir Mike Jackson, dated October 2005. He reports serious concerns about the helicopter fleet, which he says, in characteristically straight language, was "creaking badly". He goes on to say that soldiers may be forced to do longer tours of duty without rest because of the inability to transfer them out of theatre.
Servicability, flying hours and crew numbers are all factors, but the overall picture is one of an SH [support helicopter] force ill-matched to support our current operations ... If our SH capability is inadequate, our AT [air transport] fleet is worse. The airbridge to theatre is now so fragile that an efficient R&R [rest and recuperation] schedule is nigh impossible. Quite apart from the morale effect of indorinate delays, the difficulties with R&R are now beginning to impact significantly on the operational effectiveness of the division. The situation is so bad that I am asking HQ Land to re-examine whether we might not re-adopt four-month operational tours without R&R.
10.54am: Training the police was more difficult than training the army, Dannatt says.
US doctrine in Afghanistan and Iraq has moved to classic counter-insurgency. General Petraeus takes the credit for that, Dannatt says. He praises the way the US adapted so quickly. By contrast the UK army looked "flat-footed". We were doing the opposite at the time of the US surge. Between 2005-2007 the MoD's move to a central defence doctrine made us "less agile".
10.47am: Gilbert asks about military doctrine. Back in 2003-2004 our approach to training Iraqis was about training in barracks and not about embedding troops. This changed overnight from 2008, he admits. All of us in the chain of command didn't see that it would have been more effective to embed Iraqi troops, Dannatt says.
10.44am: Core equipment programmes should have changed to reflect the fact that the emergency situation of fighting two wars had become routine, Dannatt says.
He goes on to contrast the US troop surge in Iraq to the British policy of reducing troops in preparation for handing over to the Iraqis. He describes this as a "lumpy dilemma".
10:42 am: Here's some background about Snatch Land Rovers, which have been blamed for the deaths of up to 35 British soliders in Iraq. When Gordon Brown gave evidence to the Chilcot inquiry, he said that money was made available at every point when requests were made to fund new equipment. But this was disputed by other army chiefs who later gave evidence. A new £100m order for replacement vehicles was only made in March this year.
10.38am:Lady Prashar asked about the preparation. Dannatt said the Army had to prioritize the preparation of a tailor in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Army should abandon the contingency training, he acknowledges and agrees that the scale and intensity of training was limited.
The availability of equipment also hit training, Dannatt adds. "Soldiers only met these new bits of equipment when they got into theatre ... that is verging on the unacceptable," he says.
It is not acceptable to have equipment taken off soldiers once their tours of duty end, he says.
10:34 am: Asked by Gilbert about Robert Fry's comments about the army becoming overstreched, Dannatt likens the army in 2006 to a car "running hot" and in danger of seizing up.
10.30am: Gilbert moves on to asking Dannatt about equipment. There has been a lot of comment about the suitability of the Snatch Land Rover, which developed out of its use on patrol during the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Dannatt admits: "The Snatch Land Rover was significantly exposed from 2005 onwards in Iraq." He adds that the Snatch has still not been replaced.
10:29 am: Dannatt says a relatively benign situation in 2003 began to become more difficult in 2004, and became very difficult from the summer of 2005 in Iraq. With a desire to commit more forces to Afghanistan, Dannat says: "We were caught on the horns of a dilemma."
From late 2006 there was a "perfect storm" of increased insurgency, a reduction of troops in Iraq, and increased commitment in Afghanistan. The army was overstretched.
10:28 am: Afghanistan is arguably more important to get right, so the resource is especially important. "The two operations [in Iraq and Afghanistan] have always been a problem," Dannatt said. Afghanistan is more important, he adds. 'Afghanistan and the pressure on the army color all my thinking on Iraq, "he says.
10.20am: Sir Martin Gilbert now takes up the questions by asking about Dannatt's role during the Iraq campaign.
Dannatt says that during March/April 2004 the situation started to deteriorate in US-controlled Baghdad and the north of Iraq.
He describes a request from the US to put the British in charge of nine Shia provinces in the south of Iraq as "interesting".
There followed a hiatus of "non-government", he says. A decision was then taken by the government to refuse the request. But in June a decision was taken for Britain to take a major role in Afghanistan. "Wow, where did that come from?" Dannatt says he thought at the time.
10.15am: "Professionally I don't think we had any points to prove at all," Dannatt says, denying suggestions that there was a rush to war. "If you've had people killed and blown up around you, I don't think you rush into volunteering for another war."
If Britain had refused to commit a division, the US would have been disappointed, but the UK was stretched, Dannatt stresses.
10.11am:We would not rush to commit a heavy ground forces in Iraq, since the obligations in other places, said Dannatt drug.
"The desire of the army to field a division was not huge," he says. But he adds there was a bit of a feeling that if the US was going in, we, for professional reasons, wanted to go in too.
10.08am: Sir Roderic Lyne starts by asking Dannatt about the role of assistant chief of the general staff in the run-up to the invasion.
"He keeps the show on the road," Dannatt replies.
We had an "informal idea" of what was going on in terms of preparation for an invasion of Iraq, Dannatt says.
He says the general feeling during 2002 among the army was if we are going to get involved let's keep our involvement to a minimum.
He said the decision to commit the army to Iraq wasn't made until late 2002. Before that, the talk was all about giving air and naval support to the US.
9.37am: This morning the inquiry will hear from General Sir Richard Dannatt, an outspoken critic of the conduct of the Iraq war despite being the former head of the army.
Dannatt became an adviser to the Tories after stepping down as chief of the general staff last year.
Before that he was commander in chief land command and assistant chief of the general staff.
As early as October 2006 he called for British troops to be withdrawn from Iraq as he said they made security problems worse.
In an interview with the Daily Mail he said: "I think history will show that the planning for what happened after the initial successful war-fighting phase [following the invasion of Iraq] was poor, probably based more on optimism than sound planning."
"Let's face it, the military campaign we fought in 2003 effectively kicked the door in.
\\ "This is a fact. I do not 't that the difficulties we are experiencing around the world are caused by our presence in Iraq but undoubtedly our presence in Iraq exacerbates them."
Later in speech to the Royal United Services Institute he took the criticism further by complaining that Britain failed to keep enough troops on the ground, failed to address the "window of consent" with the Iraqi people, and failed to link the training of local forces with actually fighting.
Following Gordon Brown's appearance before Chilcot earlier this year, Dannatt questioned the prime minister's assurances that all the army's demands for equipment had been met.
He said there had been "underlying underfunding that goes right back to the outcome of the defence review in 1997-98, when the Treasury didn't fully fund the outcome. It has gone on since then".
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